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NLRB v. Yeshiva University: Teacher Participants
in University Policy Formulation
Deemed Managerial Under NLRA
The development of a "status quo "for teacher bargaining unit certifica-
tion was brought to an abrupt halt by the recent Supreme Court Yeshiva
decision. The author, in agreement with the majority opinion, examines
the development of this "status quo" and the cases leading up to and in-
cluding the Supreme Court's determination that the Yeshiva faculty were
managerial employees and thus exempt from coverage under the National
Labor Relations Act. Also, the author illustrates the Supreme Court's unfa-
vorable reaction to the National Labor Relations Board's cursory and in-
consistent administrative decisions and opinions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent United States Supreme Court decision of NLRB v.
Yeshiva University' threatens to negate ten years of National La-
bor Relations Board holdings and alter the development of faculty
collective bargaining in private, nonprofit educational institutions.
In affirming the court of appeals' holding that Yeshiva Univer-
sity's full-time faculty members were managerial employees, ex-
cluded from the collective bargaining provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act,2 the Court has overruled Board policy con-
cerning certification of faculty bargaining units in private, non-
profit educational institutions.
The purpose of this note is to present an analysis of the
Supreme Court's reasoning and rationale in holding that faculty
members of a private, nonprofit university are exempt from the
collective bargaining provisions of the Act as managerial employ-
ees.
II. BACKGROUND
Commencing in 1951 and continuing until 1970, the National La-
bor Relations Board, in an exercise of broad discretion, refused to
1. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
2. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1976), as amended by the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136, and the La-
bor-Mangement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L No. 86-257, 73 Stat.
519.
assert jurisdiction over private, nonprofit educational institutions
in bargaining unit certification proceedings.3 The 1951 decision of
The Trustees of Columbia University4 was based on the Board's
finding that the policies of the National Labor Relations Act
would not be effectuated should the Board exercise jurisdiction
where the activities of the institution were "noncommercial in na-
ture and intimately connected with the charitable purposes and
educational activities of the institution."5
In Columbia University, the petitioners, a local chapter of the
Community and Social Agency Employees Union-CIO, sought
certification to represent a bargaining unit of all clerical employ-
ees in the university's libraries. The university, as employer, op-
posed an exercise of jurisdiction by the Board on grounds that
the university was not engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act.6 The university also argued that it was a nonprofit ed-
ucational corporation, chartered by a special New York legislative
act, and was solely supported by endowment, gifts and student tu-
ition. Finally, the university contended that even if it did engage
in interstate commerce, thereby providing Board jurisdiction over
the university's activities, the Board should decline to assert ju-
risdiction in an exercise of discretion.
The Board denied jurisdiction based upon its interpretation of
3. The rights of employees to organize into labor organizations and to bargain
collectively with their employers are two of the basic rights guaranteed under the
National Labor Relations Act. Section 7 of the Act provides, in pertinent part:
"[elmployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining .. " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
Section 9(a) of the Act guarantees that representatives selected by a majority of
the employees in an appropriate unit shall be the exclusive representatives for the
employees included in the unit. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). Under the power
granted by § 3(b), § 9(b) and (c) of the Act, the National Labor Relations Board
[hereinafter Board] is authorized to conduct certification proceedings to deter-
mine the appropriate class of employees to be included within a unit to be repre-
sented. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(b), 159(b)-(c) (1976).
In determining the appropriate class of employees to be included in a particular
unit, the Board applies a number of factors which may include: 1) the similarity of
duties, skills, wages, and working conditions of employees involved; 2) pertinent
collective bargaining history, if any, among employees involved; and 3) the history,
extent and type of union organization in other plants of the same company of the
same industry.
Embodied within the Board's authorization to determine the appropriate unit of
employees is the power to investigate and conduct hearings for the determination
of such units, direct elections, and certify to the parties involved the name or
names of those selected to exclusively represent the unit. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (B)
(1976).
4. 97 N.LR.B. 424 (1951), overruled, 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
5. Id. at 427.
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1976).
[Vol. 8: 473, 19811 NLRB v. Yeshiva University
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
congressional intent to exclude nonprofit organizations from the
Act. The Board stated that the Senate Conference Report on the
Labor Management Relations Act of 19477 impliedly approved the
Board's previous refusals to exert jurisdiction over nonprofit orga-
nizations except in certain situations. According to the Confer-
ence Report,
nonprofit organizatons (other than hospitals) . . . are not specifically ex-
cluded in the conference agreement, for only in exceptional circumstances
and in connection with purely commercial activities of such organizations
have any of the activities of such organizations or of their employees been
considered as affecting commerce so as to bring them within the scope of
the National Labor Relations Act. 8
The Board concluded that "[r]egardless of whether or not the
conference report literally recite [d] the Board's practice prior to
the amendment of the Act, it ... indicate [d] approval of and reli-
ance upon the Board's asserting jurisdiction over nonprofit orga-
nizations only in exceptional circumstances and in connection
with purely commercial activities of such organizations." 9 The
Board conceded that while the language of the conference report
did not necessarily provide a mandate, it certainly provided a
guide for the Board to assert or deny jurisdiction in a noncom-
mercial setting. Consequently, the Board noted that while the ac-
tivities of Columbia University sufficiently affected commerce to
satisfy the Board's jurisdictional requirements outside of the non-
profit organization context, it did not believe an exercise of juris-
diction in that context would be proper. This conclusion was
based upon the Board's determination that the activities of Co-
lumbia University were predominantly noncommercial in nature
and were intimately connected with the charitable purposes and
educational activities of the institution.' 0
Ironically, the Columbia University decision did not completely
preclude the future exercise of jurisdiction over nonprofit educa-
tional institutions. The Board clearly stated that it had not, and
presumably would not, exempt such nonprofit organizations from
the operation of the Act "where the particular activities involved
have been commercial in the generally accepted sense."1 But,
7. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEG-
IsLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 505 (1948).
8. Id. at 536.
9. 97 N.L.R.B. at 427 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 425.
11. Id. The Board, supporting its statement that nonprofit organization exclu-
sion is not absolute, cited numerous decisions in which it had exerted jurisdiction
for nineteen years following the Columbia University decision,
the Board adhered to its policy to decline assertion of jurisdiction
over private, nonprofit educational institutions. However, in 1970
the Board explicitly overruled Columbia University in a decision
involving New York's Cornell and Syracuse Universities.12
In Cornell, the Board addressed the issue of whether an asser-
tion of jurisdiction over nonprofit colleges and universities would
be proper in light of the 1951 Columbia University decision.13
The Board noted that although the Act, as amended, specifically
excluded nonprofit hospitals, "it contain[ed] no such exclusion of
private, nonprofit educational institutons."'14 The Board pointed
out that its prior decision to decline jurisdiction over such institu-
tions was an exercise of discretion 5 and that in amending the
Act, "Congress was content to leave to the Board's informed dis-
cretion in the future as it had in the past, whether and when to
assert jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations whose operations
had a substantial impact upon interstate commerce." 16
In Cornell, the Board took note of the substantial increase in
commercial activities of private colleges and universities and de-
termined that while education continued to be the primary goal
of these institutions, greater commercial involvement had become
necessary to carry out educative functions. 17 The Board agreed
with petitioners Cornell and Syracuse that the rapidly expanding
activities and operations of colleges and universities had substan-
tial impact on interstate commerce. Noting that educational oper-
ations had increasingly become matters of federal interest, the
Board concluded that "this interest coupled with the failure of the
States adequately to recognize and legislate for labor relations,"18
over such organizations, including nonprofit educational institutions. Id. at n.3
(citing Sunday School Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, 92 N.L.R.B. 801
(1950)) (corporation editing and publishing religious literature); Port Arthur Col-
lege, 92 N.L.R.B. 152 (1950), overruled, 97 N.L.R.B. 384 (1951) (college operating a
commercial radio station); Illinois Inst. of Technology, 81 N.L.R.B. (1949) (college
and affiliated research foundations performing industrial research sponsored by
business concerns); Association Canado-Americaine, 72 N.LR.B. 520 (1947) (fra-
ternal society operating insurance business); Henry Ford Trade School, 63
N.L.R.B. 1134 (1945) (vocational school performing services for industrial concern).
12. Cornell University, 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). The Board consolidated Cor-
nell and Syracuse's petitions seeking election and certification of bargaining repre-
sentatives for a unit composed of nonacademic employees.
13. Id. at 329.
14. Id. at 330. See note 8 supra.
15. 183 N.L.R.B. at 331. The Board stated that the congressional grant of dis-
cretionary power "hardly seem[ed] inadvertent .... Congress was well aware
that the Board's discretionary standards for asserting jurisdiction [were] not
fixed, but had been changed from time to time." Id.
16. Id. at 331.
17. Id. at 332.
18. Id. at 329. Additionally, the Board recognized the futility of the situation
[Vol. 8: 473, 1981] NLRB v. Yeshiva University
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justified an assertion of jurisdiction by the Board. The Board's
position was amply stated when it held that it could
no longer adhere to the position set forth in the Columbia University deci-
sion. Accordingly, that case is overruled. Charged with providing peaceful
and orderly procedures to resolve labor controversy, we conclude that we
can best effectuate the policies of the Act by asserting jurisdiction over
nonprofit, private educational institutions where we find it to be appropri-
ate. 9
Following the initial assertion of jurisdiction in Cornell, a new
issue began to emerge concerning the classification of employees
to be included in appropriate bargaining units 20 at private, non-
profit colleges and universities. The issue of classifying faculty
and professional staff members for inclusion in appropriate bar-
gaining units, thereby entitling them to the benefits and protec-
tions of the Act, first arose in C. W. Post Center of Long Island
University.21 In C. W. Post Center, the local chapter of the United
Federation of College Teachers (union) sought certification to
represent a separate bargaining unit of all professional employ-
ees22 involved directly or indirectly in student instruction. 23 The
when it stated "[wI ith or without Federal regulation, union organization is already
afait accompli at many universities." Id. at 333 (noting Ferguson, Collective Bar-
gaining in Universities and Colleges, 19 LAB. L. J. 778, 791-804 (1968)).
19. 183 N.L.R.B. at 334. The Board's new position was perhaps more strongly
propounded when it proclaimed "we are convinced that assertion of jurisdiction is
required over those private colleges and universities whose operations have a sub-
stantial effect on commerce to insure the orderly, effective and uniform application
of the national labor policy." Id.
The Board's rationale reflects the policy enumerated in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act which provides in pertinent part:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by en-
couraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by pro-
tecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment
or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). Notably, the Board did not believe it was prepared at the
time of the Cornell decision to establish jurisdictional standards for the class of
nonprofit educational institutions and deferred determination of the issue until
sufficient data could be provided.
20. See note 3 supra.
21. 189 N.LR.B. 904 (1971).
22. The petition for certification to represent a separate unit comprised of pro-
fessional employees was requested in compliance with § 9(b) (1) of the Act. 29
U.S.C. § 159(b) (1) (1976). The section mandates that the Board shall not declare
any unit which includes both professional and nonprofessional employees as an
appropriate unit unless a majority of the professional employees vote to include
nonprofessional employees within the unit. The Act, as amended, provides:
Board noted that C. W. Post Center was "the first case in which
the Board [was] called upon to make appropriate [bargaining]
unit determinations in regard to university teaching staffs."24
In opposition to the petition, the university argued that an as-
sertion of jurisdiction should not be applied to its professional
personnel and, in the alternative, that full-time faculty members
should not be included in the bargaining unit of professional em-
ployees. The university believed that the responsibilities and au-
thority held by full-time faculty rendered them exempt from
coverage of the Act as supervisory25 or managerial 26 employees.
The term 'professional employee' means-
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and va-
ried in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical or
physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and
judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the output pro-
duced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a
given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a
field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of
specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher
learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education
or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine
mental, manual, or physical processes; or
(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intel-
lectual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a),
and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of a professional
person to qualify himself to become a professional employee as defined in
paragraph (a).
29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976).
23. The petitioner's request in C.W Post Center to represent a separate bar-
gaining unit of all professional employees included all full-time faculty, adjunct
faculty, librarians, counselors, research associates, and laboratory assistants.
24. 189 N.L.R.B. at 904.
25. Employees classified as "supervisors" are specifically excluded from the
provisions of the Act under § 2(3). 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). Section 2(11) of the
Act, as amended, provides:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the in-
terest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility
to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend
such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such au-
thority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976).
Judicial interpretation of § 2(11) has established that possession of any one of
the enumerated powers in § 2(11) or the power to effectively recommend with re-
spect to any one of them is sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition of a super-
visor. NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 405 F.2d 1169, 1177 (2d Cir. 1968).
The statutory exclusion of supervisors from the Act arose from congressional
concern for the protection of the rights of rank-and-fie employees to organize and
bargain collectively without undue influence from other employees closely associ-
ated with management interests. Additionally, the exemption reflected a congres-
sional belief that the unionization of supervisors deprives employers of their right
to the undivided loyalty of their representatives. Id. at 1178.
26. The National Labor Relations Act does not mention or define managerial
employees. The exemption developed as'a result of the Board's recognition that
Congress intended, albeit impliedly, to exclude employees classified as "manage-
[Vol. 8: 473, 19811 NLRB v. Yeshiva University
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The Board summarily dismissed the university's jurisdictional
claim by ruling that professional personnelZ 7 who "have the usual
incidents of the employer-employee relationship .. are employ-
ees within the meaning of the Act . . [and] are entitled to its
benefits."2 8
Addressing itself to the university's claim that full-time faculty
were exempt from the Act's coverage, 29 the Board discussed the
structure of Long Island University and the authority and respon-
sibilities of professional personnel involved in student instruction.
rial" from the provisions of the Act. One of the rationales for the exemption is
that because these types of employees are so much higher in the authority hierar-
chy than those expressly exempted, Congress believed no specific exclusionary
provision was necessary. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1974). A
second rationale, similar to that supporting the supervisory exemption, stems
from a congressional and judicial belief that an employer is entitled to the undi-
vided loyalty of its representative. Id. at 281.
In Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946), the Board defined managerial person-
nel as "employees who are in a position to formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies. These employees we have considered and ... deem to be
,managerial,' in that they express and make operative the decisions of manage-
ment." Id. at 1322.
Judicial approval of the exemption is found in Bell Aerospace where the
Supreme Court concluded that managerial employees were unmistakably ex-
cluded from the Act. In Bell Aerospace, the Court cited with the approval the
opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the case of Illinois State
Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1969), which explained that
the managerial exclusion
embraced not only an employee 'so closely related to or aligned with man-
agement as to place the employee in a position of conflict of interest be-
tween his employer on the one hand and his fellow workers on the other'
but also one who is 'formulating, determining and effectuating his em-
ployer's policies or has discretion independent of an employer's estab-
lished policy, in the performance of his duties.'
Id. at 41.
Thus, the exclusion, as interpreted in Bell Aerospace, is applied to those em-
ployees found to be: 1) aligned with management; 2) formulating, determining
and effectuating management policies; and 3) exercising discretion within or inde-
pendently of established employer policy.
27. See note 22 supra.
28. 189 N.L.R.B. at 904 (citing Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1132
,(1948)).
The Act, as amended, provides in pertinent part:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be lim-
ited to the employees of a particular employer ... but shall not include
any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic
service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed
by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of independ-
ent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor ....
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1973).
29. See notes 25 and 26 supra.
The Board found that the university was governed by a board of
trustees, a chancellor, and three presidents, each assigned to one
of the three centers operated by the university. The authority,
duties and responsibilities of faculty members were found to be
governed by university-established "statutes" under which full-
time faculty were granted the power to formulate and recommend
various student and faculty policies. 30 However, the Board found
that these faculty "decisions" were in fact subject to final review
by the university's administration and board of trustees. Addi-
tionally, the Board determined that in exercising their authority,
"the faculty acts as a group, on the basis of collective discussion
and consensus." 31 Expanding upon this observation, the Board
concluded:
[TIhe policymaking and quasi-supervisory authority which adheres to
full-time faculty status but is exercised by them only as a group does not
make them supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11)32 of the Act,
or managerial employees .... Accordingly, we find that full-time univer-
sity faculty members qualify in every respect as professional employees
under Section 2(12) of the Act, 3 3 and are therefore entitled to all the ben-
efits of collective bargaining .... 34
The Board, in C.W. Post Center, used two rationales in deter-
mining whether faculty members were supervisors or managers.
The rationales included the collectivity of faculty decisional ac-
tions and the ultimate authority of administrators to review
faculty actions.
A third rationale, the proposition that collective authority is ex-
ercised in the faculty's own interest and not on behalf of the uni-
versity, was introduced in the Board's Adelphi University35
30. Under the governing statutes, faculty were given the power and responsi-
bility to formulate student admission, curriculum, graduation and honor assign-
ment policy. Concurrently, the faculty also made determinations concerning
"Iflaculty status including appointment, reappointment, promotion, tenure, and
dismissal . 189 N.L.R.B. at 905.
31. Id.
32. See notes 25 and 26 supra.
33. See note 22 supra.
34. 189 N.LR.B. at 905 (emphasis added). The Board's opinion further deter-
mined that all professors, associate professors, assistant professors, instructors,
adjunct professors, adjunct associate professors, adjunct assistant professors, lec-
turers, professional librarians, research associates and guidance counselors were
to be included in the bargaining unit of professional employees. Id. at 908. The
Board's finding was based upon the conclusion that adjunct faculty members "are
regular part-time professional employees whose qualifications and chief function,
teaching, are identical with those of the full-time faculty." Id. at 905-06.
Excluded from the unit were deans and department chairmen, who were found
to be supervisors, id. at 906; laboratory assistants who performed "merely techni-
cal functions," id. at 907; and admissions and academic counselors who do not per-
form "the intellectual and varied tasks contemplated . . . in Section 2(11) of the
Act .. " Id. at 908.
35. 195 N.LR.B. 639 (1972). In Adelphi University, the Board included in the
unit faculty members who had been elected to a personnel grievance committee
[Vol. 8: 473, 19811 NLRB v. Yeshiva University
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opinion. This rational fortified the Board's denial of supervisory
or managerial exemptions to full-time faculty. Subsequently, a
majority of Board decisions denying the exemptions in faculty
representation cases were based upon the rationales announced
in C. W. Post and Adelphi University.36
As demonstrated by its continued adherence to these ratio-
nales, 37 the Board desired to maintain the newly developed "sta-
tus quo" criteria in faculty representation cases. However, the
Supreme Court's decision in Yeshiva 38 and the determination
that the university's faculty were managerial employees may
serve to indicate that there can be no "status quo" in faculty rep-
resentation cases.
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
Yeshiva University is a private, nonprofit institution of higher
learning that operates five undergraduate and eight graduate
schools on four campuses in New York City. In October 1974, the
Yeshiva University Faculty Association filed a petition for certifi-
cation to represent a bargaining unit composed of full-time
faculty members at ten of the thirteen schools.39 The trustees of
the university, in opposition to the petition, contended that all of
its faculty members were managerial personnel and therefore not
employees within the meaning of the Act.40 Between November
1974 and May 1975, hearings were conducted before a Board-ap-
which dealt with all issues concerning full-time faculty. The Board found no merit
in the university's claim that committee members exercised supervisory authority
because it believed the trustees sought only advice from the committee and the
faculty had agreed to channel its collective advice through the committee. Thus,
Adelphi University clarified the Board's position on "ultimate authority" in addi-
tion to advancing the rationale that authority is exercised in the faculty's own in-
terest.
36. See, e.g., Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975); University of Miami,
213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974); Tusculum College, 199 N.LR.B. 28 (1972); New York Univ.,
205 N.LR.B. 4 (1973); Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971), overruled, 201
N.L.R.B. 1026 (1973).
37. See note 36 supra.
38. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
39. The schools involved were Yeshiva College, Stern College for Women,
Erna Michael College, Yeshiva Program, James Striar School of General Jewish
Studies, Belfer Graduate School of Science, Ferkauf Graduate School of Humani-
ties and Social Sciences, Wurzweiler School of Social Work, Bernard Revel Gradu-
ate School and Teacher's Institute for Women. Id. at 675 n.2.
40. See note 26 supra.
pointed officer.41 The case was subsequently heard on three
levels. In order to maintain clarity, each decision will be dis-
cussed separately.
A. National Labor Relations Board Findings and Decision
During the hearings, the Board determined that the university
is governed by a central administration and directed by a board of
trustees. Members of the board of trustees, other than the Presi-
dent who acts as the university's chief executive, hold no other
administrative positions within the university. The President is
assisted by four vice-presidents responsible for student affairs,
business affairs, academic affairs, and medical and science affairs.
An Executive Council composed of deans and administrators
from the several schools makes recommendations to the Presi-
dent and trustees with respect to various matters. Two other
committees 42 consisting of elected student and faculty represent-
atives and the dean or director of each academic unit participate
in the formulation of university-wide policies concerning such
matters as teaching loads, salary scales, tenure, sabbaticals, re-
tirement and fringe benefits. Faculty members, along with stu-
dents and administrators, also sit on the Committee on Academic
Priorities and Resource Allocation, organized for the purpose of
providing long-range academic and fiscal priorities at Yeshiva.
The committee is also empowered to re-evaluate the objectives of
the schools of the university and to review class sizes, staffing
patterns, physical facilities and tuition levels. Through these
elected student-faculty advisory councils, the faculty actively par-
ticipates in university-wide governance. The only university-wide
faculty body is the Faculty Review Committee, composed of eight
tenured faculty members elected from the various schools to ad-
just faculty grievances by informal negotiation and formal advi-
sory recommendations to the President.
During the hearings, it was established that each program,
school and college at Yeshiva enjoys substantial autonomy in for-
mulating and implementing its own institutional, academic and
professional policies. It was additionally determined that through
formal and informal faculty meetings and committees at each
41. Section 3(b) of the Act, as amended, provides, in pertinent part: "The
Board is also authorized to delegate to its regional directors its powers... to de-
termine the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining, to investi-
gate and provide for hearings, and determine whether a question of representation
exists, and to direct an election ... and certify the results thereof. 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(b) (1976). See also note 3 supra.
42. The two other committees participating in university-wide governance
were the Council of Graduate Schools and the Council of Undergraduate Schools.
[Vol. 8: 473, 1981] NLRB v. Yeshiva University
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school, the members of the faculty effectively formulate, determine
and implement major policies43 concerning student, faculty, aca-
demic and administrative matters."
Despite findings that the faculty at Yeshiva exercise substantial
autonomy, the Board rejected the trustee's contention that all
faculty members were managerial. Consistent with the rationales
set forth in C. W. Post Center and Adelphi University, the Board
concluded that the faculty were professional employees entitled
to the benefits of collective bargaining. This conclusion was
based upon the Board's determination that Yeshiva faculty partic-
ipation in collegiate decision-making was "on a collective rather
than individual basis . . . , exercised in the faculty's own interest
rather than in the interest of the employer, and final authority
rested with the board of trustees."4 5
The Board found that the Yeshiva University Faculty Associa-
tion was a labor organization within the meaning of the Act46 and
that a unit composed of full-time faculty was an appropriate bar-
gaining unit.47 In December 1975, the Board granted the Associa-
tion's petition and directed an election.4 8 Pursuant to the Board's
direction, an election was held and the Faculty Association was
43. Testimony by one dean established that an estimated 98 percent of faculty
recommendations from his school were approved and implemented by the central
administration. 444 U.S. at 677 n.5.
44. Records of the hearings established that faculty members at each school
determined and effectuated major policy concerning admissions, scholastic stan-
dards, curriculum, scheduling, grading systems, matriculation requirements, hir-
ing, appointment and reappointment of faculty, promotion and tenure, starting
salaries, salary increases, budgets and administrative requirements. 582 F.2d 686,
689-94 (2d Cir. 1978).
45. Yeshiva University, 221 N.L.R.B. at 1054 (1975).
46. The Act, as amended, provides:
the term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or
any agency or employee representation committeee or plan, in which em-
ployees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part,
of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976).
47. The bargaining unit approved by the Board included full-time faculty with
the titles of professor, instructor, and any adjunct or visiting faculty member with
such rank, department chairmen, division chairmen, senior faculty and assistant
deans. The Board also found that "terminal" faculty, those who at the date of the
election had received notice of termination or nonrenewal of appointment, or had
reached mandatory retirement age or had given notice of intent to resign, were eli-
gible to vote in the representation election if still employed at the date of election.
221 N.LR.B. at 1056-57.
48. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1057.
certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employ-
ees in the unit.
Maintaining its original position that full-time faculty were ex-
empt as managerial personnel, the university refused to bargain
with the union. Consequently, an unfair labor practice proceed-
ing was instituted in February 1977. The Board found the univer-
sity to be acting in violation of sections 8(a) (1) and (5) of the
Act 49 and ordered the university to bargain collectively with the
union.5 0 The university continued its refusal to bargain which re-
sulted in the filing of a petition for enforcement of the Board's or-
der with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
B. Court of Appeals Findings and Decision
The second circuit denied the Board's petition and refused to
enforce the order, stating that "without any analysis the Board
found that Yeshiva's full-time faculty were neither supervisors
nor managerial personnel simply by stating that the substantial
authority of the faculty was wielded in their capacity as profes-
sionals and by invoking three doctrines promulgated in earlier
Board rulings."51
The court sharply criticized the Board for failing to appropri-
ately analyze the facts 52 surrounding the university's claim that
the faculty exercised sufficient authority to bring them within the
managerial exemption defined in Bell Aerospace.53 According to
the court, the Board's failure to acknowledge the degree of control
and authority retained by Yeshiva's faculty resulted in the
Board's application of "unjustified [and] arbitrary standards" 54 in
denying a supervisory or managerial exemption.
49. Section 8(a) (1) of the Act provides that it is unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in their right to organize
and to engage in collective bargaining. Section 8(a) (5) provides that refusal by
employers to bargain collectively with representatives of employees is also unfair
labor practice. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) and (a) (5) (1976).
50. 231 N.L.R.B. 597 (1977), rev'd, 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978).
51. 582 F.2d 686, 696 (2d Cir. 1978), aff'd, 444 U.S. 672 (1980). See note 36 supra
and accompanying text.
52. In reviewing the rulings of the Board-appointed officer, the Board made no
findings of fact regarding Yeshiva University. See 444 U.S. at 679; 582 F.2d at 702;
221 N.L.R.B. at 1053. See also note 54 infra.
53. See note 26 supra.
54. 582 F.2d at 703. The court believed that since the Board had made no find-
ings of fact, an inquiry into the record was necessary. Id. at 702. Upon an exami-
nation of the record, the court found that the authority exercised by the Yeshiva
faculty compelled a finding that faculty members were managerial employees
under the Bell Aerospace decision. Id. at 703. Thus, the court determined that the
application of "unjustified" and "arbitrary standards" was a result of the Board's
failure to make findings of fact and apply faculty authority to the principles of Bell
Aerospace.
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Upon a closer examination of the facts, the court found that as a
result of the broad power exercised by Yeshiva faculty in the for-
mulation and implementation of major university policy, the
faculty members were, "in effect, substantially and pervasively
operating the enterprise."5 5 The second circuit then ruled, regard-
less of the rationales advanced by the Board that, "thefacts com-
pel the conclusion under long established standards that the full-
time faculty has managerial status." 56
On petition for writ of certiorari from the Board, the United
States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and granted
certiorari.5 7 Subsequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the second circuit5 8 and signaled a change in policy re-
garding labor relations in private non-profit eductional
institutions.
IV. SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS
In announcing its affirmation of the second circuit's ruling that
Yeshiva faculty members were managerial employees and thus
excluded from the Act's coverage, the Yeshiva Court59 initiated
its analysis with a discussion of the Board's initial exercise of ju-
risdiction over private, nonprofit educational institutions and the
development of the three rationales announced in C. W. Post
Center and Adelphi University.60 The Court criticized these ratio-
nales, stating
without explanation, the Board initially announced . . . [the] rationales
for faculty cases, then quickly transformed them into a litany to be re-
peated in case after case: (i) faculty authority is collective, (ii) it is exer-
cised in the faculty's own interest rather than in the interest of the
university, and (iii) final authority rests with the board of trustees. 6 1
55. Id. at 698.
56. Id. at 703 (emphasis added). See note 54 supra.
57. 440 U.S. 906 (1979).
58. 444 U.S. at 673.
59. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Burger, and Associate Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined.
60. See notes 1-36 supra and accompanying text.
61. 444 U.S. at 684-85 (citations omitted). The Court's condemnation of the
Board's lack of explanation in announcing the three rationales is not without sup-
port. In C. W Post Center, the Board simply stated that it was their "view" that the
collectivity of faculty decisionmaking and the power of ultimate authority reserved
by administrators did not make faculty members supervisors within the meaning
of the Act; nor did the Board cite any precedent for their "view." 189 N.L.R.B. at
905. Again in Adelphi University, the Board failed to cite a single case as prece-
dent to support the "interest of the faculty" rationale, resorting only to C. W Post
The Court recognized, as did the Board, that Yeshiva faculty
were professional employees within the meaning of the Act,62 and
as such, may be exempted from the Act as either supervisors who
exercise independent judgment in the interest of their employer6 3
or as managerial employees involved in formulation and imple-
mentation of employer policy.64 The Court determined that an
application of the managerial exclusion, rather than the supervi-
sory exclusion, would be appropriate in Yeshiva. This determina-
tion was based upon the Court's belief that an analysis of the
faculty's supervisory status was unnecessary due to the Court's
approval of the second circuit's application of the managerial ex-
clusion.65
Center as precedent for advancing the "collective authority" and "ultimate author-
ity" rationales. 195 N.L.R.B. at 648.
62. See note 22 supra.
63. See note 25 supra. As established by several Board decisions, classifica-
tion of employees as professionals under § 2(12) of the Act does not necessarily
preclude the supervisory exemption.
In Sutter Community Hosps. of Sacramento, 227 N.L.R.B. 181 (1976), profes-
sional registered nurses with authority to interpret and direct patient care, assign
duties and evaluate performance of other nursing personnel were excluded as su-
pervisors from a bargaining unit comprised of other professional nurses. In a simi-
lar case, Presbyterian Medical Center, 218 N.L.R.B. 1266 (1975), 18 registered
nurses appointed as "head nurses" for patient care units were excluded as super-
visors as their duties included authority to assign work and evaluate other nurses
within their respective care units, effectively recommend salary increases, approve
vacations and leaves of absence, take disciplinary actions and settle grievances.
In the educational context, department chairmen and directors of various in-
tradepartmental programs at the University of Vermont who performed supervi-
sory functions of hiring full and part-time faculty, setting salaries, assigning and
scheduling courses, preparing and allocating budgets, and administering verbal
and written discipline were classified as supervisors by the Board. University of
Vermont, 223 N.L.R.B. 423 (1976).
64. See note 26 supra. The Board has repeatedly excluded those professional
employees found to be managerial under Bell Aerospace. In Neighborhood Legal
Servs., 236 N.L.R.B. 1269 (1978), an attorney employed as an "assistant trainer" by
a nonprofit corporation providing legal services to indigent clients was found to be
a managerial employee and excluded from a bargaining unit of other legal profes-
sionals. The Board determined that, in addition to training, assisting and directing
other attorneys and legal assistants, the affected attorney's authority to review
overall programs and implement overall goals of the employer justified the mana-
gerial exclusion. 236 N.L.R.B. at 1269.
Similarly, a clinical medical specialist assigned to a new hospital department
was subject to the managerial exemption as the degree of responsibility exercised
in the development of new care methods, policies and procedures closely aligned
her with management interest. Notably, the clinical specialist was a subordinate
of the director and associate director of nursing who were classified only as super-
visors. Sutter Hospitals, 227 N.L.R.B. at 192-93.
65. 444 U.S. at 682. The Court also stated that the supervisory status of the
faculty need not be addressed as the second circuit had not ruled on that issue.
Id. Although the second circuit made no determination of the issue, it thoroughly
analyzed the application of the supervisory exemption as it applied to Yeshiva's
faculty. The second circuit reasoned that the faculty did not clearly fit into the
statutory definition of a supervisor as the section requires that an individual pos-
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A. Managerial Exclusion As Applied to Yeshiva University
In applying the managerial exclusion, the Court re-examined
the definition of a managerial employee as it related to the au-
thority exercised by Yeshiva faculty members. Noting that the
Bell Aerospace decision provided judicial approval of the Board's
policy regarding the exemption,6 6 the Court summarized the defi-
nition of managerial employees as "those who 'formulate and ef-
fectuate management policies by expressing and making
operative the decisions of their employer.' "67
According to the Court, in order to fall within the managerial
exemption, employees must (i) exercise discretion within or inde-
pendently of established employer policy; and (ii) be aligned
with management.68 Thus, prior to classifying an employee or a
group of employees as managerial, it must be established that
those employees are in fact performing functions within the two
prongs of the Bell Aerospace test. As noted by the Court, the
Board has never established any firm criteria for determining
when employees are aligned with management. However, the
Court, broadly interpreting the Board's decision in Sutter Hospi-
tals,69 determined that an employee "may be excluded as mana-
gerial only if he represents management interests by taking or
recommending discretionary actions that effectively control or im-
plement employer policy. ' 70
In Yeshiva, the Board argued that faculty members failed to
meet the latter prong of the Bell Aerospace test because as pro-
sess one or more of the enumerated powers and faculty supervisory authority is in
fact exercised collectively. See note 25 supra. Additionally, since supervisory au-
thority must be exercised with respect to employees, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976), the
faculty also failed to meet this requirement since their supervisory authority was
directed to students. However, as the second circuit noted, this argument was
weakened considerably upon recognition of the fact that full-time faculty exer-
cised supervisory authority over part-time faculty. 582 F.2d at 699.
Finally, the second circuit concluded that the technicalities of faculty supervi-
sory authority need not be resolved as the definition of "managerial employee" did
not require the exercise of "individual" authority. See note 26 supra. Conse-
quently, the second circuit determined that the Bell Aerospace managerial exemp-
tion was applicable to Yeshiva University faculty members. 582 F.2d at 699-700.
66. See note 26 supra.
67. 444 U.S. at 682 (quoting Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 288). See also note 26
supra.
68. 444 U.S. at 683. See also Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 286-87, and note 26
supra.
69. See note 64 supra.
70. 444 U.S. at 683.
fessional employees, faculty members were neither "expected to
conform to management policies [nor] judged according to their
effectiveness in carrying out those policies."'71 Additionally, the
Board contended that the university expected faculty members to
exercise "'independent professional judgment' while participat-
ing in academic governance."7 2 According to the Board, this exer-
cise of independent professional judgment gives the appearance
that faculty exercise managerial authority when they actually
only perform routine professional duties. 73 Thus, the Board con-
cluded that the exercise of independent professional judgment
negated a finding that the faculty members were aligned with
management because the university expected the faculty to "pur-
sue professional values rather than institutional interests."7 4
The Supreme Court was not convinced that the exercise of in-
dependent professional judgment removed the faculty from the
managerial exclusion.7 5 At first glance, it appears that the Court
failed to consider the language of prior Board decisions 76 in its
71. Id. at 684.
72. Id. The Board has previously held that performance of routine job duties
by professional employees necessarily involves a high degree of independent pro-
fessional discretion and judgment which, by its very nature, effectuates or imple-
ments employer policy. However, this exercise of "independent professional
judgment" does not automatically confer managerial status upon those profes-
sional employees. Thus, in General Dynamics, 213 N.L.R.B. 851 (1974), the Board
denied managerial status to senior engineering and administrative personnel who
routinely exercised discretion in employee work assignment and direction having
a direct bearing on employer policy. The denial of managerial status was based
upon the Board's determination that such discretion was grounded solely upon
professional competence and responsibility and did not involve the exercise of
managerial authority. Id. at 857-59.
The Board, citing General Dynamics, reiterated its position with the opposite re-
sult in Sutter Hospitals, see note 64 supra, when it stated that "professional em-
ployees are not the same as management employees merely because their
professional competance necessarily involves a consistent exercise of discretion
and judgment in a manner which may affect an employer's business direction or
established policy." 227 N.L.R.B. at 193. However, the Board did find that the pro-
fessional employee involved in Sutter Hospitals was exercising managerial author-
ity in that the work performed went "beyond that incidental to professional
training and experience and . . . actually involve[d] the formulation of policies
and procedures .. " Id.
73. 444 U.S. at 683-84.
74. Id. at 684.
75. Id. at 686. The Court observed that the Board did not cite any cases di-
rectly applying an "independent professional judgment" standard. The only case
cited by the Board in support of the contention that the exercise of independent
professional judgment necessarily removed the faculty from the managerial exclu-
sion was that of NLRB v. Fullerton Publishing Co., 283 F.2d 545, 549 (9th Cir. 1960),
in which a news editor could be deemed nonsupervisory as he did not "direct" em-
ployees within the meaning of the exemption. See note 25 supra. Because the
case was not applicable to Yeshiva as it involved only the supervisory exemption,
the Court chastized the Board for incorrectly citing Fullerton Publishing Co. as au-
thority in a managerial context. 444 U.S. at 687 n.24.
76. See note 72 supra.
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haste to condemn the Board for attempting to create a new "in-
dependent professional judgment" criterion. But a closer analysis
of Justice Powell's reasoning reveals an underlying dissatisfaction
with the Board's inconsistent application of the managerial ex-
emption policy to university faculties. 7 7
The rationale for dismissing the Board's contention that the ex-
ercise of independent professional judgment precluded an appli-
cation of the managerial exemption hinged upon the Court's
interpretation of previous Board policy. While recognizing that
the Act's exclusion of managerial employees and inclusion of pro-
fessional employees created somewhat of a conflict,78 the Court
reasoned that prior Board decisions had excluded professionals
as managerial employees without determining whether decision-
making was primarily an exercise of independent professional
judgment or managerial authority.7 9 The Court noted that in Sut-
ter Hospitals the Board had excluded professional employees
who relied upon professional judgment to exercise managerial au-
thority,80 thus giving rise to the inference that the Board itself
had "implicitly rejected the contention that decisions based on
professional judgment cannot be managerial."8 1 The Court deter-
mined that an application of an independent professional crite-
rion would, by implication, overrule Board precedent and "result
in the indiscriminate recharacterization ... of professionals
working in supervisory and managerial capacities" 82 as employ-
77. 444 U.S. at 684-85. Additionally, the Court chastized the Board for sug-
gesting that an application of an independent professional judgment criterion
would be appropriate in Yeshiva since the Board itself had not relied on such a
rationale in its own decision. Id.
78. The Court explained that tension between the exclusion of managerial em-
ployees and the Act's inclusion of professional employees is created by the fact
that professional employees continue to rely on their special skills and training in
exercising managerial authority. This simultaneous exercise of independent pro-
fessional judgment and managerial authority creates a conflict in determining
whether these employees should be classified as professional employees entitled
to the protections of the Act or excluded as managerial employees under Bell
Aerospace. Id. at 686-87.
79. See Neighborhoold Legal Servs., 236 N.L.R.B. 1269 (1978), and note 64
supra.
80. See note 64 supra.
81. 444 U.S. at 687.
82. Id. The Court found an additional flaw in the Board's analysis of the
faculty's exercise of independent professional judgment. As previously refer-
enced, see text accompanying note 71, the Board relied upon the premise that
faculty members were not expected to conform to university policies to advance
the argument that faculty were not aligned with management. Justifiably, the
ees covered by the Act.
The Court was dissatisfied with the Board's inconsistent appli-
cation of established policy regarding professionals and the mana-
gerial exclusion. This dissatisfaction was manifested in the
Court's application of the managerial exemption to the Yeshiva
faculty in a manner consistent with established Board policy,
something which the Board itself had failed to do in this and
other faculty representation cases. 83 The Court determined that
the controlling consideration in Yeshiva was the extent of author-
ity exercised by the faculty.84 In an attempt to promote consis-
tent implementation of prior policy, the Court noted that "the
faculty at Yeshiva University exercise authority which in any
other context unquestionably would be managerial." 85 Finally,
the Court concluded that "It] o the extent the industrial analogy 86
applies, the faculty determines within each school the product to
be produced, the terms upon which it will be offered, and the cus-
tomers who will be served." 87
Upon first glance, Justice Powell's use of an industrial analogy
appears incongruous within a university context analysis. 88 How-
Court criticized the Board's reliance on this statement by pointing out that "a con-
formity to management policy" test was untenable since managerial employees,
according to the first prong of the Bell Aerospace test, necessarily exercise discre-
tion within or independently of employer policy. See note 68 supra and accompa-
nying text.
83. See note 36 supra.
84. 444 U.S. at 686. The Court's determination of this "controlling considera-
tion" was completely consistent with both judicial and Board policy regarding the
managerial exclusion. In Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320
(1947), the Board stated that "[tjhe determination of 'managerial,' like the deter-
mination of 'supervisory,' is to some extent necessarily a matter of the degree of
authority exercised." Id. at 323 n.4 (emphasis added). In N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aero-
space, 416 U.S. 267 (1978), the Court established that "the specific job title of the
employees involved is not in itself controlling ... the question whether particular
employees are 'managerial' must be answered in terms of the employees' actual
job responsibilities, authority, and relationship to management." Id. at 290 n.19.
These statements are not to be interpreted as substitutes or separate tests for
the determination of managerial status. They are merelyfactors to be considered
in application of the Bell Aerospace test.
85. 444 U.S. at 686. As indicated by the facts of the case, Yeshiva faculty mem-
bers effectively exercised authority in formulating and implementing major uni-
versity policy. See notes 41-44, 52-53 supra and accompanying text. See also note
103 infra and accompanying text. Within the industrial context the exercise of
this type of authority has been unanimously deemed supervisory or managerial.
See notes 25 and 26 supra.
86. Justice Powell's reference to an industrial analogy pertains to the histori-
cal fact that the Act and its various exemptions were designed to accommodate
the employer-employee relationship which exists in the hierarchial authority
structure found in private industry. 444 U.S. at 680. See also Adelphi University,
195 N.L.R.B. at 634, 648 (1972).
87. 444 U.S. at 686.
88. An industrial analogy appears inappropriate because private, nonprofit in-
stitutions have not traditionally been viewed as "industries" in that they are not
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ever, reference to an industrial analogy is not inappropriate in
view of the Board's failure to analyze the factual implications of
the extent of authority exercised by university faculties. This fail-
ure resulted in the development of the "collective authority," "ul-
timate authority," and "interest of the faculty" rationales-
rationales which, as will be seen, are inconsistent with previous
exemption policy. Thus, an industrial analogy89 is useful in the
consistent application of managerial exemption policy in faculty
representation cases.
Focusing on the invalidity of the "interest of the faculty" ration-
ale, the Court did not discuss the "collective authority" or "ulti-
mate authority" rationales in any depth. However, for purposes
of presenting a clear understanding of the Yeshiva decision, the
Court's treatment of each rationale will be discussed separately.
B. The "Collective Authority" Rationale
The lack of in-depth discussion regarding the "collective author-
ity" rationale cannot be viewed as a failure by the Court to prop-
erly address Board rationale. Rather, it was the result of the
Board's abandonment of this rationale in its appeal before the
Supreme Court.90
Notwithstanding this abandonment, the Court concluded that
the "collective authority" rationale was, as with the independent
professional judgment criterion proposed by the Board, "flatly in-
consistent with [the Board's] precedents." 91 This conclusion is
not unreasonable in light of the inconsistency of prior Board deci-
sions which held that the exercise of collective authority was suf-
ficient grounds for granting an exclusion. 92 Additionally, no
considered to be profitmaking enterprises. But as the Board itself recognized in
Cornell, colleges and universities have increasingly become involved in a number
of commercial activities and, in fact, realize commercial profits from their opera-
tions. 183 N.L.R.B. at 332.
89. See notes 86 and 88 supra.
90. 444 U.S. at 685 n.20. Indeed, the Court indicated that the Board no longer
claimed the "collective authority" and "ultimate authority" were legal rationales
for consideration in Yeshiva. Rather, the Board argued that the rationales were
facts which supported the contention that the faculty exercised authority only to
serve their own interests.
91. 444 U.S. at 685.
92. See Florida Southern College, 196 N.L.R.B. 888, 889 (1972) (dean who re-
tained faculty position excluded from bargaining unit because he sat on a commit-
tee which made effective recommendations regarding the status of faculty
members); Sida of Hawaii, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 194, 195 (1971) (individuals of em-
legislative history exists which supports the Board's reliance on
the "collective authority" rationale. 93 Indeed, neither the second
circuit nor the Supreme Court discovered any precedent for the
rationale, a finding substantiated by the failure of the Board to
cite even one case upon which to base its rationale.94
As indicated by the second circuit and impliedly approved by
the Supreme Court, in the absence of support for the rationale, a
more realistic approach to the exercise of collective authority is to
exclude those individuals who effectively exercise authority
through groups or committees. 95 Indeed, the reasonableness of
this approach becomes evident upon consideration that collective
consultation and authority is the norm in modern corporate and
institutional decisionmaking. 96
Regardless of the norms of modern corporate decisionmaking,
the fatal flaw in denying managerial status based upon a "collec-
tive authority" rationale is the fact that the Board has made no
distinction between individual and collective exercise of authority
in the application of the managerial exclusion in non-university
contexts. 97 This fact, coupled with the Board's inconsistent appli-
cation of the rationale and failure to cite any supporting prece-
dent in C. W. Post Center or subsequent cases, led the Court to the
conclusion that the "collective authority" rationale was neither
tenable nor logical.98
C. The "Ultimate Authority" Rationale
As with the "collective authority" rationale, the Board did not
advance the "ultimate authority" rationale as a basis for denying
exemption to the Yeshiva faculty 99 even though it was one of the
ployee-stockholder group excluded from bargaining unit as they were found to
have an effective voice in determining company policy as well as terms and condi-
tions of their employment); Red and White Airway Cab Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 83, 85
(1959) (one hundred thirteen employee-stockholders excluded from bargaining
unit because their collective authority provided them an effective voice in the for-
mulation and determination of corporate policy).
93. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-5 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., 13-18 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 35-36 (1947).
94. 189 N.L.R.B. at 905. The Board's key statement in C. W. Post Center, which
denied supervisory or managerial status based upon the exercise of collective au-
thority, was noticeably devoid of any supporting precedent. See also note 61
supra.
95. 582 F.2d at 699.
96. 444 U.S. at 699. (citing N. JACOBY, CORPORATE POWER AND SOCIAL RESPON-
SiBILITY 58 (1973); H. OLECK, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS, § 183,
(1956)).
97. See note 92 supra.
98. 444 U.S. at 685-86 nn.21 & 22.
99. See note 90 supra.
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grounds upon which the Board relied in its own decision.100
Again, the Court indicated that the "ultimate authority" rationale
was inconsistent with Board precedent. In rejecting the rationale,
the Court stated that the concept of "ultimate authority" was not
viable for support of denying supervisory or managerial status as
"every corporation vests that power in its board of directors."1o
The reasoning behind the Court's conclusion is illustrated in
the second circuit's opinion. In the lower court's view, the "ulti-
mate authority" rationale is untenable in that although every cor-
poration is subject to the ultimate authority of the board of
directors, this fact "has never precluded a finding that there are
managerial or supervisory employees in the corporation.'l 0 2 It
follows that if the "ultimate authority" rationale was to be consist-
ently relied upon, there would be virtually no situation where the
exemptions could be applied since every corporate employee who
exercises managerial or supervisory authority is subject to the ul-
timate authority of a board of directors.
In any event, the ultimate authority reserved by trustees in the
university context, and especially at Yeshiva, has no appreciable
effect on university governance as authority is delegated to
faculty and administrators by the trustees. 0 3 Thus, it is evident
that the concept of "ultimate authority" can have no effect, legally
or logically, on the determination of managerial or supervisory
status.
D. The "Interest of the Faculty" Rationale
The Court sharply criticized the "interest of the faculty" ration-
ale when it indicated that the Board had merely assumed that
Yeshiva faculty members, in exercising independent professional
judgment, acted solely in their own interest and not in the inter-
est of their employer. Pointing out that the Board had failed to
make any findings of fact, 0 4 the Court determined that an exami-
nation of the record disclosed no basis upon which the Board
100. 221 N.L.R.B. at 1054.
101. 444 U.S. at 685 n.21.
102. 582 F.2d at 701.
103. For a discussion of the diffused authority of university trustees and the
unique governance structure of educational institutions, see McHugh, Collective
Bargaining With Professionals in Higher Education: Problems in Unit Determina-
tions, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 55 (1971).
104. 444 U.S. at 679.
could reasonably conclude that faculty and university interests
were "distinct, separable entities."1 0 5 Instead, the Court found
that a factual analysis of the faculty's crucial role in university
governance1 0 6 indicated that "the faculty's professional interest
... cannot be separated from those of the institution."10 7
The Court's conclusion is clarified and supported by Justice
Powell's comparison of university and faculty interests. As ex-
plained by the Court, te university's interests lie in establishing
and maintaining a quality educational institution. Accordingly,
the university's primary interest is academic excellence, the ac-
complishment of which is dependent upon the formulation and
implementation of sound academic policies through faculty deci-
sionmaking.108 Correspondingly, faculty professional interests, by
nature, also concern academic excellence and the advancement of
scholastic standards. From this comparison, it is clear that a com-
munity of interests exists between the university and faculty
members. 0 9
In addition to this community of interest, the Court determined
that the university, qua employer, necessarily depends upon
faculty exercise of professional judgment in establishing major
policy. In fact, "[t] he university requires faculty participation in
governance because professional expertise is indispensable to the
formulation and implementation of university policies." 110
As a result of the comparison of interests and university-faculty
interdependence analysis, the CQurt concluded that "there can be
no doubt that the quest for academic excellence and institutional
distinction is a 'policy' to which the administration expects the
faculty to adhere, whether it be defined as a professional or an in-
stitutional goal.""' This "policy" to which faculty are expected to
adhere, coupled with the factual implications that faculty mem-
bers effectively formulate and implement major university pol-
105. Id. at 688.
106. See notes 42-44, 55 supra and 114 infra and accompanying text.
107. 444 U.S. at 688.
108. Id. (citing K. MORTIMER & T. MCCONNELL, SHARING AUTHORITY EFFEC-
TIVELY 23-24 (1978)).
109. The Court was particularly unconvinced by a claim that salary and benefit
issues resulted in a divergence between faculty and university interests. Con-
versely, the Court asserted that "there is arguably a greater community of interest
on this point ... because the nature and quality of a university depend so heavily
on the faculty attracted to the institution." 444 U.S. at 688-89 n.27, (citing B. RICH-
MAN & R. FARMER, LEADERSHIP, GOALS AND POWER IN HIGHER EDUCATION 258
(1974); D. BORNHEIMER, G. BURNs & G. DUMKE, THE FACULTY IN HIGHER EDUCATION
174-75 (1973)).
110. 444 U.S. at 689.
111. Id. at 688.
[Vol. 8: 473, 1981] NLRB v. Yeshiva University
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
icy,"n2 bring the Yeshiva faculty squarely within the Bell
Aerospace definition of managerial employees. Thus, the Board's
contention that faculty members acted solely in their own interest
was undermined by the reasoning of the Court.113
Aside from Justice Powell's analysis, there are additional indi-
cations that the "interest of the faculty" rationale is an unsup-
portable theory in Yeshiva and other factually similar cases. An
examination of the Yeshiva facts establishes that faculty and uni-
versity interests are inextricably interwoven. An analysis of the
extent of authority exercised by faculty members reveals that
their role in the governance structure was not merely advisory.
Rather, the record establishes that faculty decisions and formula-
tion of major university policy proved definitive in university gov-
ernance.114
The inapplicability of the "interest of the faculty" rationale is
perhaps clarified by a brief examination of the university-faculty
relationship as set forth in one authority." 5 As explained by the
author,
[t Ihe faculty, by the very nature of the educational process in institutions
of higher education, participates in decision making which in private in-
dustry would normally be regarded as a management prerogative ....
The university is, ideally, a professional community in which common ed-
ucational interests supersede all potential divisions between the faculty
and administration. The university's unique set of goals (education, re-
search and service) is achieved only by a series of specialist communities
working together .... Thus, there is no sharp dividing line between the
community of administrators and the community of faculty, for both have
the common goal of striving to further the institution as a house of learn-
112. See notes 42-44, 55 supra and 114 infra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text.
114. The faculty's effectiveness in formulating and effectuating major policy is
evidenced by the record in Yeshiva. For example, the dean of Yeshiva College
testified that he felt compelled to execute decisions of the Faculty Assembly
which had authority to establish admissions and scholastic standards, grading sys-
tems and other academic policy. The dean further noted that during his 16 years
as dean, the University President had never vetoed a Faculty Assembly decision.
At the Teacher's Institute for Women, applicants for teaching positions were not
hired if any faculty member expressed the slightest objection. In one instance, the
faculty effectively overruled the dean's decision to release a faculty member for
budgetary reasons.
Faculty members at Belfer Graduate School retain jurisdiction over curriculum,
department formulation and class size, and financial policies. Hiring, promotion,
tenure, and nonrenewal of appointment are determined by department faculty
members. Additionally, the faculty at Belfer successfully removed the dean in
1968. See 582 F.2d at 690-94.
115. Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education The Failure of Policymaking
Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 63 (1973).
ing.116
This principle of "shared authority" negates the proposition
that faculty members act primarily in their own interest because
faculty, administrators and trustees have joint authority and re-
sponsibility for the governance of the university." 7 It can readily
be seen that reliance on the "interest of the faculty" rationale re-
sults in a "strained [and] artificial separation" of faculty and uni-
versity interests.1 18
V. THE DISSENT
Supporting the Board's rationales and conclusion that faculty
members were not managerial employees, Justice Brennan's dis-
sent"l9 found little merit in the reasoning advanced by the Court.
Not surprisingly, the language of the dissent closely resembled
that of the Board's in denying supervisory or managerial status to
faculty members.
The tone of the dissenting opinion strongly indicates the minor-
ity's dissatisfaction with the Court's determination that faculty in-
terests cannot be separated from those of the university.120
Indeed, a closer reading of the dissent reveals that the dissenting
justices believed the Court's analysis suffered from the majority's
failure to recognize that faculty influence in university govern-
ance was not a result of the exercise of any managerial authority
but consisted only of collective professional advice.121 As ex-
plained by Justice Brennan, the administration merely solicited
faculty advice, which in turn was offered by the faculty as a
means by which to serve its own interests. 22 Consequently, ad-
ministrators deferred to faculty recommendations only when the
recommendations were deemed consistent with administrative
needs and policy. Based on the foregoing, the dissent concluded,
as the Board had, that faculty authority was collectively exercised
and always subject to the ultimate decisionmaking authority of
administrators and trustees.123
116. Id. at 68.
117. For an excellent discussion of the concept of "shared authority," see State-
ment on Government of Colleges and Universities, 52 A.A.U.P. Buul. 375 (1966).
118. 582 F.2d at 701.
119. 444 U.S. at 691 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by White, Marshall, and
Blackman, J.J.).
120. Id. at 694-704.
121. The dissent apparently believed the Court had completely misinterpreted
the characteristics and the faculty's exact role within the decisionmaking process.
Id. at 696. Contrary to the Court's determination that the concept of shared au-
thority prevailed at Yeshiva, the dissent maintained that the university's authority
structure was primarily hierarchial in nature. Id. at 697.
122. Id. at 697.
123. Id. at 698.
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The assertion that faculty participation in university govern-
ance is merely advisory seems rather simplistic and unpersuasive
in light of the factual implications presented in the case. Appar-
ently, the dissenting justices did not fully consider the actual ef-
fect of faculty decisions and policy formulation at Yeshiva. 124
Ignoring factual findings that both university and faculty interests
in maintaining a quality institution and achieving academic excel-
lence are accomplished by sharing authority,125 the dissent seem-
ingly chose to disregard the established policy that employees
who formulate and effectuate management policies are, as set
forth in Bell Aerospace,126 managerial employees.
The dissent also contended that the faculty members were af-
forded authority over academic policies such as hiring, promotion
and decisions traditionally considered managerial, and "such dis-
cretion does not constitute an adequate basis for the conferral of
managerial or supervisory status." 2 7 The obvious invalidity of
this statement is that its effect would operate to completely emas-
culate the supervisory and managerial exemptions as the author-
ity deemed "inadequate" by the dissent is precisely the type of
authority which, when exercised effectively, is deemed supervi-
sory or managerial. 128
The dissent states that the Yeshiva decision would operate to
destroy the Act's deterrent value in protecting professional teach-
ers from unreasonable administrative action. 129 The dissenting
justices concluded that the majority's decision would ultimately
result in "strikes or other forms of economic warfare"13 0 on the
nation's campuses. The defect of these criticisms is that they are
fraught with the same misinterpretations as those of the Board:
the failure to recognize that the relationship between faculty and
university is that of a community of interest. The dissent's argu-
ments may be appropriate for a number of universities where, un-
124. See notes 41-44, 52-53 and 114 supra and accompanying text.
125. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
126. See note 26 supra.
127. 444 U.S. at 698 n.8 (emphasis added). The dissent believed the faculty's au-
thority was analogous to "hiring-hall agreements" in which the employees' union
is given the exclusive right to recommend personnel to the employer. Id. The dis-
sent fails to recognize that in addition to exercising authority with respect to hir-
ing, faculty members were given discretion in establishing a number of other
university policies. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
128. See notes 25 and 26 supra.
129. 444 U.S. at 705.
130. Id.
like Yeshiva, significant tensions exist between faculty
professional goals and administrative economic priorities. How-
ever, the record in the present case clearly indicated that these
types of conflicts do not exist at Yeshiva. Given the dissent's own
belief that university administrations strive to defer to faculty
professional interests,' 3 ' the likelihood of incidents of labor-man-
agement strife on the nation's campuses seem patently remote.
VI. IMPACT OF THE CASE
While only practical application of the guidelines delineated by
the Court will demonstrate the actual impact of the decision, a
close analysis reveals that the decision was not intended to result
in the reclassification of all university professionals as supervi-
sors or managers as suggested by the dissent.132 Likewise,
whether future reliance on the C. W. Post Center and Adelphi Uni-
versity rationales will be permitted is questionable. Although the
Yeshiva decision did not expressly preclude an application of the
"collective authority," "ultimate authority" or "interest of the
faculty" rationales in future faculty representation cases, the lan-
guage of the opinion strongly suggests that the Court does not
consider them sufficient grounds upon which the Board may deny
supervisory or managerial status. Conversely, the opinion does
not purport to establish a set test or particular rationale to be ap-
plied in determining faculty status for collective bargaining pur-
poses. Rather, the opinion specifies, consistent with prior Board
policy, 33 that a professional employee will be deemed aligned
with management and classified exempt only if that professional
employee is found to be performing duties beyond those inciden-
tal to similarly situated professionals. 3 4 This conclusion clearly
indicates that the key factor, to be considered on a case-by-case
basis in future faculty representation cases, is the extent of au-
thority exercised by faculty members in the formulation and im-
plementation of university policy.1 35 Thus, when such authority is
granted to faculty members, whether expressly granted or im-
pliedly conferred through consistent deference to faculty advice,
those faculty members will be found to be performing duties be-
yond those incidental to similarly situated faculty members and
will be deemed aligned with management and classified as ex-
empt. 3 6
131. Id. at 697.
132. See notes 129-30 supra and accompanying text.
133. See notes 64 and 72 supra.
134. 444 U.S. at 690.
135. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
136. See note 134 supra.
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Perhaps the most significant indication of the intended impact
of Yeshiva is evidenced in the closing footnote of the opinion.137
The footnote unmistakably qualifies the decision by stating that it
is meant only to provide a starting point for analysis in determin-
ing whether university faculty members exercise the type of au-
thority sufficient to bring them within the exemptions.138
The underlying theme of the Yeshiva decision, as previously
discussed, is the Court's dissatisfaction with the Board's inconsis-
tent and cursory application of established exemption policy to
university faculties.139 While recognizing that the Act was specifi-
cally designed to cope with labor relations in an industrial con-
text, the Court did not believe that the unique characteristics of
the employer-employee relationship in universities justified a de-
parture from these policies.
VII. CONCLUSION
A realistic interpretation of the opinion suggests that the Board
must alter its cursory rationales and methods for determining the
status of faculty members in appropriate bargaining unit composi-
tion. Thus, the decision can be seen as a redirection of Board
analysis to effectuate consistent application of established criteria
for the determination of managerial status. In any event, the
opinion leaves no doubt that the Board is now compelled to en-
gage in meaningful analysis' 40 that can only be viewed as befit-
137. 444 U.S. at 690-91 n.31.
138. See notes 25 and 26 supra. The Court noted that
other factors not present [in Yeshiva] . .. may enter into the analysis in
other contexts.... There thus may be institutions of higher learning un-
like Yeshiva where the faculty are entirely or predominately nonmanager-
ial. There also may be faculty members at ... like universities who
properly could be included in a bargaining unit. It may be that a rational
line could be drawn between tenured and untenured faculty members, de-
pending upon how a faculty is structured and operates.
444 U.S. at 690-91 n.31.
139. See note 77 supra. See also notes 25 and 26 supra.
140. The lower court's reversal of the Board's Yeshiva decision was upheld on
grounds that the Board's opinion failed to state relevant findings of fact and was
devoid of factual analysis. 444 U.S. at 673. Citing Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437
U.S. 483, 501 (1978), the Court reiterated that it "accord[s] great respect to the ex-
pertise of the Board when its conclusions are rationally based on articulated facts
and consistent with the Act. In this case, we hold that the Board's decision satis-
fies neither criterion." 444 U.S. at 691.
See also 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (A)-(B) (1976), which provides in pertinent part:
The record shall show the ruling on each finding, conclusion, or exception
ting a governmental agency charged with the responsibility of
administering national labor policy.
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presented. All decisions, including initial, recommended, and tentative
decisions, are a part of the record and shall include a statement of-
(A) findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all
the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record;
and
(B) the appropriate rule, order, sanction, relief, or denial thereof.
According to K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 16.03 (3d ed. 1972), the policy
behind the above requirements is to 1) facilitate judicial review of administrative
proceedings; 2) avoid judicial usurpation of administrative functions; 3) assure
careful administrative consideration; 4) aid parties in planning cases for rehearing
and judicial review; and 5) keep administrative agencies within their jurisdictions.
